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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction o\ er this matter pursuant to legislative 
authority granted to the Utah Supreme Court in U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). This matter 
was taken by the Utah Supreme Court for consideration by Writ of Certiorari, granted on 
October 1, 2009.l In Granting the Writ of Certiorari, the Supreme Court narrowed the 
issue, and ordered, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the 
Writ of Certiorari be granted only as to the following issue: 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AS 
ESTABLISHED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
"Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
construction of the scope of the arbitration provision of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman Act."2 
1
 This appeal arises from a consolidated case that involves a road that crosses 
through both Box Elder and Cache Counties. Box Elder is the only Appellee in this case 
because the Selmans" - the Appellants, prior application for permission to appeal the trial 
court's decision regarding Cache County was dismissed on procedural grounds. See, 
Appellate Case No. 20070682-CA. Therefore, Cache County is not a party to this appeal. 
2
 See, Order Granting Certiorari issued by the Utah Supreme Court, on October 1, 
2009, Case No. 20090479-SC. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In the decision issued by the Court of Appeals in Selmcrn v. Box Elder County, 208 
P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009). the Court of Appeals held that "[b]ecause we conclude that 
the outcome of this case depends on statutory interpretation, we review the district 
court's decision for correctness" Id. at 537 (emphasis added). Where the grant of the 
Writ of Certiorari did not request this issue be briefed, Appellees conclude that this is the 
proper standard of review. 
KEY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. CASE LAW, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009) (See Addendum 
"A") 
2. Utah Code Ann. §13-43-101 et. seq. (See Appellants' Brief Addendum "C") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Appellants (the "Selmans" or "Appellants") brought separate suits against 
Appellee ("Box Elder County," "County" or "Appellee") and Cache Counties 
challenging resolutions (hereinafter "Resolutions") the counties passed reiterating the 
public nature of a road (hereinafter "Road") that runs roughly east-west between Mantua 
City in Box Elder County through to Paradise City in Cache County. 
On April 30, 2007. the Selmans filed their first complaint in Box Elder County, 
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requesting, inter alia, injunctive relief. On May 1 1, 2007, Judge Ben Hadfield of the 
First Judicial District Court in Box Elder County granted partial injunctive relief, 
allowing the defendants to gate the Road; the injunction also prohibited Box Elder 
County from doing any construction on the road. Contrary to the Selmans' request, the 
district court ordered the Selmans not to lock the gate; however, the court did allow the 
plaintiffs to place a sign on the gate indicating that the issue of the Road's ownership was 
currently being litigated in the district court. See Addendum B. 
On May 23, 2007, the Selmans filed a second complaint against Box Elder County 
asking the court to find that the Resolutions constituted an "inverse condemnation" of 
their property. Before Box Elder County could answer this complaint, on June 7, 2007, 
the Selmans then filed a request for arbitration of the takings/eminent domain issues with 
the Property Rights Ombudsman (hereinafter "Ombudsman") to have the takings/eminent 
domain issues asserted by the Selmans in their inverse condemnation claims before Judge 
Ben Hadfield, arbitrated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13- 43-101 et. seq. See 
Addendum C. After the Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, Box Elder 
County filed an answer and counterclaim to the Selmans' amended complaint asserting a 
counterclaim to quiet title in the property. To Box Elder's knowledge the quiet title 
action was never made known to the Ombudsman. 
The Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the district court in Cache County by 
filing another complaint on June 25, 2007, again asserting, inter alia, an inverse 
condemnation claim. Cache County then answered this complaint with a counterclaim 
asking Judge Low to quiet title in the road. In their complaints and amended complaints, 
the Selmans requested a jury trial. The Selmans had invoked the jurisdiction of two 
district courts as well as the Ombudsman at the same time. 
The Course of the Proceedings 
While the injunctive relief requested by Selmans was granted in part, the district 
courts have never ruled on whether or not the Resolutions passed by the counties 
constitute inverse condemnation. Further, the issue regarding who owns the Road has yet 
to be resolved because jurisdiction over the case has been before appellate courts. Before 
the appeals, however, important decisions were rendered by the district court judges. 
On August 7, 2007, Judge Gordon Low granted Cache County's motion to 
bifurcate the Selmans' amended complaint alleging inverse condemnation and Cache 
County's counterclaim requesting the court to quiet title, concluding u[a]fter review of 
the memoranda and affidavits filed in this case, the Court is satisfied that judicial 
economy would be achieved should a bifurcation occur, and that [Cache County's] 
counterclaim should be first litigated as it may be dispositive of a number of other claims 
made by the Plaintiffs which would be better addressed separately." See Addendum C. 
Judge Low also found that he had jurisdiction to stay the proceedings before the 
Ombudsman pending a resolution of the quiet title action. Id. 
The Selmans then petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for permission to appeal 
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Judge Gordon Low's decision to stay the arbitration; however, they failed to timely file 
their appeal, and their request was denied. 
The Disposition Below 
Eventually, the counties filed motions to consolidate the two cases, and to 
bifurcate, inter alia, the Selmans' inverse condemnation claim and the counties' quiet 
title actions in the consolidated cases. Judge Ben Hadfield granted the counties' motions, 
consolidating the two cases and bifurcating the inverse condemnation claim and the quiet 
title actions, finding, in relevant part: 
[T]he threshold issue as to ownership of the disputed road 
should be resolved first, as bifurcation is likely to further 
convenience . . . an efficient resolution to this matter. 
Furthermore the Court finds that bifurcation should be 
granted because regardless of who actually owns the property, 
an initial determination of ownership would likely lead the 
parties to negotiate a settlement of remaining claims. Finally, 
with respect to the Property Rights Ombudsman Act, it 
appears the Court has the authority to issue a stay. Therefore, 
the Court will order a stay, but reserves for future 
adjudication the question of whether the Property Rights 
Ombudsman Act applies to the instant matter. This issue may 
be raised after the threshold issue of ownership is determined. 
See Memorandum Decision of Judge Ben Hadfield, Addenda E, pg. 4. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
1. Throughout all proceedings and appeals, the Selmans have acknowledged 
that the property in question is in an "Agricultural Protection Area." Utah Code Ann. 
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17-41-401 et. seq.; See Brief of Appellant at pages 4, 5 and 8. 
2. The complaint filed before the district court in both counties alleges a 
violation of the Agricultural Protection Act. Utah Code Ann. 17-41-405. See Brief of 
Appellant at pages 4 - 5. 
3. Survey maps dating as early as 1878 show that the Road crossed federal 
land and connected the towns (now cities) of Mantua and Paradise. It was one of the 
primary access points to Cache County from the south. See Addendum F. 
4. Based upon survey maps and other maps that predate any ownership of the 
property surrounding the Road by the Selmans, Box Elder County and Cache County 
passed resolutions finding the Road to be a public Road. However, nothing in either 
resolution indicates any intent to take the Road by Eminent Domain. 
5. Neither Box Elder County, nor Cache County have ever held hearings to 
condemn the Road pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-405, which is the basis for the 
Selmaifs claim in their complaints before the district court that both counties have 
violated the Utah Agricultural Protection Act, specifically that portion of the Agricultural 
Protection Act in Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-405. See Brief of Appellant at pages 4 -5. 
6. On April 30, 2007, the Selmans filed their first complaint in Box Elder 
County before Judge Ben Hadfield, invoking the jurisdiction of the district court 
disputing the findings in the Resolutions. (District Court Case No. 070100436) 
7. On N4ay 11, 2007 Judge Hadfield granted, in part, the Selmans^ request for 
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injunctive relief; however, because of the historical use of the Road and pending 
litigation regarding ownership of the Road. Judge Hadfield did not allow the Selmans to 
lock a gate that closed the road. (See Addendum B) 
8. On May 23, 2007 the Selmans filed a second complaint asking the district 
court to find that the Resolutions - despite the injunctions, constituted "inverse 
condemnation." The Selmans also complained that the counties had violated the 
Agricultural Protection Act. (District Court Case No. 070100436) 
9. On June 7, 2007, the Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. 
(See Addendum C) 
10. On June 25, 2007, the Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the District 
Court in Cache County by filing, inter alia, an inverse condemnation claim and a 
violation of the Agricultural Protection Act. (District Court Case No. 070101434). 
However, on December 20, 2007, Judge Hadfield consolidated the two district court 
cases, bifurcated the Selmans' inverse condemnation claim and the counties Quiet Title 
Action. The Selmans appealed. (See Addendum E) 
11. On April 16, 2009. the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision styled 
Selmcin, Inc. \\ Box Elder County. 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009). In its decision, the 
Utah Court of Appeals found: 
Some issues peripherally related to a takings claim are not 
appropriate for arbitration by the Ombudsman; the ownership 
of the property in dispute is one such issue. Further, the 
district court clearly retains jurisdiction over any matters not 
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before the Ombudsman. Indeed, "[t]he trial court has original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-5-102(a) (2008). 
See Selmcin v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 j^ 11. Based upon this finding the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that the district court retained jurisdiction over the issue of 
property ownership because of the Quiet Title Action: 
We conclude that the ownership of the property in dispute 
is a threshold issue to the subsequent question of whether 
there has been a taking. The facts of this case illustrate why 
such threshold questions are appropriately resolved judicially 
before arbitration. 
In their original complaint, the Selmans asserted three 
causes of action: claims for trespass and inverse 
condemnation and a petition for injunctive relief. Box Elder 
County did not assert a takings or eminent domain action and 
defended its position with a claim to quiet title. Thus, the 
claims in this case are currently amorphous. So long as the 
very ownership of the Property is in dispute, the remaining 
claims are undefined. 
Id. at 5371H| 9 - 10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Court of Appeals properly interpreted the Property Rights Ombudsman Act 
by reviewing the plain language of the Act. Because the plain language of the Act 
provides that only "private property owners" can invoke the provisions of the Act, the 
Court of Appeals correctly found that the issue of ownership of the property does not fall 
under the statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman but must first be determined by the 
district court. 
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Consequently, in order for the Ombudsman's office to assert jurisdiction over this 
matter, it would have to inappropriately assume that the Selmans own the Road and that a 
taking has occurred. Such an assumption is an entirely inappropriate function of the 
Ombudsman and would result in an improper expansion of the scope of the Act. As a 
result, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the District Court's 
construction of the scope of the Act. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN 
ACT. 
In Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009), the Court of 
Appeals examined the following provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman Act: 
The Ombudsman Act establishes and defines the Office of 
the Property Rights Ombudsman, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-
43-101 to -206 (supp. 208. Among other things, the 
Ombudsman is authorized to mediate or arbitrate disputes 
between property owners and government entities: 
If requested by the private property owner and 
otherwise appropriate, the . . . Ombudsman shall 
mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration for, disputes 
between private property owners and government 
entities that involve: 
(a) takings or eminent domain issues; 
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 78B, Chapter 6. 
Part 5, Eminent Domain: or 
(c) disputes about relocation assistance under 
Title 57. chapter 12, Utah Relocation Assistance Act. 
Id § 13-43-204(a). 
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See Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 % 7. The Utah Court of Appeals 
properly established the general rule before interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204(a), 
to wit: "'In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. We do 
so by First evaluating the best evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language 
of the statute itself. We give the words of the statute their plain, natural, ordinary, and 
commonly understood meaning.' Wasatch County v. OkeIberry\ 2008 UT 10, ^  13, 179 
P.3d 768 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We thus carefully consider the 
statutory language at issue.'" Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 ^ 6. The 
Court of Appeals then outlined the Appellant/Selmans' argument regarding the 
interpretation of the statute: 
In this case, arbitration has been stayed pending judicial 
resolution of Box Elder County's quiet title counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs [Selmans] argue that quiet title actions fall under the 
umbrella of "takings or eminent domain issues" articulated by 
subsection (a), and thus should be included in, not litigated 
prior to. the arbitration. We disagree, concluding that this 
interpretation reads the phrase "takings or eminent domain 
issues" too broadly. 
Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 |^ 8. The Court of Appeals then analyzed 
the common meanings of the words "taking" and "eminent domain" and thereafter. 
concluded: 
We conclude that the ownership of the property in dispute is 
a threshold issue to the subsequent question of whether there 
has been a taking. The facts of this case illustrate why such 
threshold questions are appropriately resolved judicially 
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before arbitration. 
Selmcm v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 538 <| 9. 
In their brief to the Utah Supreme Court, the Selmans first point out the "shall" 
language in Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 (a), to wit: w1f requested by the private property 
owner and otherwise appropriate, the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall 
mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The Selmans 
ignore the fact that a "private property owner'' is the only entity that has standing to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; rather, the Selmans move directly to a circular 
analysis of the word "shall" so they can assert that since they requested the Ombudsman 
to mediate in this case, the district court must relinquish its jurisdiction to the Quiet Title 
Action to the Ombudsman so that the Ombudsman can decide if the Selmans are actually 
private property owners before determining the damage award the Selmans are entitled to 
because of an alleged taking. See Appellant's Brief, pages 14-16. 
A. By expanding the scope of the Act at the Selmans' request, the 
Ombudsman was forced to assume that the Selmans own the Road, contrary to Box 
Elder County's claim that the county owns the Road; otherwise the Ombudsman 
could not take jurisdiction of this case from the district court. 
In their brief, the Selmans assert they do not have to establish, a priori, they 
actually own the property in question. They brush aside the fact that a Quiet Title Action 
is pending before the district court to determine if the Selmans are private property 
owners of the disputed land, and assert that the Ombudsman can assert jurisdiction over 
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the action and determine the issue of property ownership after the Ombudsman takes 
jurisdiction over the case. See Appellant's Brief, page 16. As they argued before the 
Court of Appeals, the Appellant's Brief asserts, "ownership of property is at the heart of 
all takings disputes. Ownership is the first of several mandatory elements in any takings 
claim." Id. (Citations omitted). Box Elder County does not dispute this. The real issue, 
however, is whether ownership issues should be settled before the Ombudsman asserts 
jurisdiction and removes a Quiet Title Action from the jurisdiction of the district court. 
The purpose of the Act, as evinced by the language of the Act and a common 
sense reading of the Acf is to give the Ombudsman an opportunity to arbitrate an award 
between a property owner whose property is being taken by eminent domain by a 
government entity. The language of the Act makes this clear: For example. Utah Code 
Ann. § 13-43-204(d) provides. u[i]n arbitrating a dispute, the arbitrator shall apply the 
relevant statutes, case law, regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in 
conducting the arbitration and in determining the award." Id. (emphasis added). The 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 continue by providing, "Within 30 days after 
an arbitrator issues a final award, and except as provided in Subsection (3)(e), any party 
may submit the award, or any issue upon which the award is based, to the district court 
for de novo review" Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 (i) (emphasis added). It is clear that 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768, 774 J^ 13 (Utah 2008) 
12 
the jurisdictional authority of the Ombudsman - and the purpose for arbitration under the 
Act, is to help arbitrate a monetary damage award between a private property owner and 
the government to compensate the property owner for property taken by eminent domain. 
Nothing in the Act indicates it was created to remove Quiet Title Actions from courts. 
1. By attempting to broaden the scope of the Act, and in order to wrest 
jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman must abandon a 
position of neutrality and must assume the Selmans own the Road. 
Again, the first paragraph of Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 states in relevant part, 
fcvIf requested by a property owner and otherwise appropriate, the Office of the Property 
Rights Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration . . . . '" Id. (emphasis 
added). All of the citizens of Box Elder County, not just the Selmans own the portion of 
the Road that the Selmans claim as their own. Survey maps and other documents show 
that the Road connects Mantua City in Box Elder and Paradise City in Cache County, and 
has done so since 1877. See Addendum F. The Road was established as a public road by 
use long before the Selmans purchased a portion of the property surrounding the Road in 
1952. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105(1); see also^ Ch. 142 § 1116, Laws of Utah, 1911. 
Now. persons using the Road must travel a number of miles to find that the portion of the 
Road that crosses the Selmans' property is closed; then they must turn around and 
proceed back down the Road. Of course the Selmans dispute that the Road was created 
by use prior to 1877 or that it was one of the primary roads connecting Cache County to 
other cities in the south. This is, in fact, the very focus of the Quiet Title Action before 
13 
the district court. See (District Court Case No. 070100436). But either way, it is 
improper for the Ombudsman to take sides to establish jurisdiction. 
2. By attempting to broaden the scope of the Act, and in order to wrest 
jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman has assumed that 
the Selmans own the Road creating an appearance of impropriety. 
Again, nothing in the Act indicates it was created to remove jurisdiction of a Quiet 
Title Action from the district courts and bestow jurisdiction in the action to the 
Ombudsman. As admitted, Box Elder County agrees with the Selmans that "private 
property ownership is the first of several mandatory elements in any takings claim." See 
Appellant's Brief at page 17. Again, the question should be whether the Ombudsman 
can assume the Selmans are private property owners in this case to take jurisdiction from 
the district court and thereafter decide the ownership issue without at least some 
modicum of undisputed evidence that the Selmans actually own a portion of the Road. 
Instead of requiring some undisputed evidence that the Selmans own a portion of 
the Road, the Ombudsman wants to take jurisdiction of this case based upon an 
assumption the Selmans own the road. Again, only a "property owner" can request the 
assistance of the Ombudsman to determine an award for damages under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-43-204. By broadening the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204, the 
Ombudsman's assumption - despite Box Elder's contrary claim, that the Selmans own a 
portion of the Road creates an appearance of bias and impropriety. Box Elder County 
suggests it defies common sense and the intent of both Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-201 et. 
14 
seq. and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-101 et. seq. to conclude that the Utah Legislature 
wanted mediation or arbitration conducted by an Ombudsman's office that is not neutral 
3. The Court of Appeals was correct when it refused to broaden the scope 
of the Act to the extent that the Ombudsman's jurisdiction would be 
based upon assumptions that favor one party over another. 
In its decision, the Utah Court of Appeals - while not specifically addressing the 
issues discussed herein, nonetheless touched upon them: 
In this case, arbitration has been stayed pending judicial 
resolution of Box Elder County's quiet title counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs argue that quiet title actions fall under the umbrella 
of "takings or eminent domain issues" articulated by 
subsection (a), and thus should be included in, not litigated 
prior to, the arbitration. We disagree, concluding that this 
interpretation reads the phrase "takings or eminent domain 
issues" too broadly. 
A "taking" is "[t]he government's actual or effective 
acquisition of private property either by ousting the owner 
and claiming title or by destroying the property or severely 
impairing its utility/' Black's Law Dictionary 1467 (7lh ed. 
1999). Relatedly, "eminent domain" is u[t]he inherent power 
of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, 
especially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to 
reasonable compensation for the taking." Id. At 541. Both of 
these terms begin with the premise that a private property 
owner actually owns the property at issue: title to the property 
is not in dispute. 
Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 at 537-538 ffi| 8-9. The Court of Appeals 
analysis here is correct. Ownership of the Road is the centerpiece of Box Elder's lawsuit 
against the Selmans. Box Elder strongly contends it owns all of the Road, including the 
portion that crosses the Selman's property, and that the Road has been a public Road 
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since the late 1800fs. The Court of Appeals was correct when it refused to broaden the 
scope of the Act to the extent that it would allow the Ombudsman to assume otherwise. 
B. By expanding the scope of the Act at the Selmans' request the 
Ombudsman was forced to assume that there is a takings in this case, contrar) to 
Box Elder County's claim that there is no taking. 
Nothing in any record - no findings of fact or conclusions of law, support the 
Ombudsman's conclusion that this case involves a takings issue. The Selmans have 
referred to the Resolutions; however, the Resolutions are not part of any record and it is 
impossible for the Ombudsman to assume that these Resolutions indicate that Box Elder 
County inversely condemned the property 4 Further, the district court has enjoined the 
county from exercising any control over the Road, thereby making inverse condemnation 
impossible. Further, the Court of Appeals further found: 
In their original complaint, the Selmans asserted three 
causes of action* claims for trespass and inverse 
condemnation and a petition for injunctive relief. Box Elder 
County did not assert a takings or eminent domain action 
and defended its position with a claim to quiet title Thus, 
the claims in this case are currently amorphous. So long as 
4
 Again, Box Elder County is troubled by the assumptions that the Ombudsman is 
making in order to wrest jurisdiction of this case from the district court, and the lack of 
neutrality it demonstrates. At the present time, the district court has enjoined Box Elder 
County from improving the Road The Selmans still have their gate across the road. It is 
inappropriate for the Ombudsman to assume "imerse condemnation "' particular^ where 
the Selmans still control the portion of the Road that crosses their property Further, the 
issue of "m\erse condemnation" is an issue of contention, and it shows bias on the part of 
the Ombudsman to attempt to take jurisdiction away from the district court based upon an 
assumption of "inverse condemnation." 
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the very ownership of the Property is in dispute, the 
remaining claims are undefined. 
Selman v Box Elder Conn ft, 208 P 3d at 537 % 10. (Emphasis added) 
1. By attempting to broaden the scope of the Act, and in order to wrest 
jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman must assume 
there has or will be a "taking" in the foreseeable future b) Box Elder 
County, even though Box Elder County has no intention of 
condemning the property. 
While the Court of Appeals lefused to assume that Box Elder County intends to 
condemn the Road if Box Eldei County loses the Quiet Title Action, the Selmans are 
pushing this assumption, and the Ombudsman seems willing to side with the Selmans to 
acquiie jurisdiction This forces Box Elder County to place facts in Box Eldei County's 
Appellate Brief that are not a part of any record to rebut what the Selmans and the 
Ombudsman want the Supreme Court to assume Not now, noi in the foreseeable future, 
M /// Box Eldei Conn ft commence condemnation proceedings to acquire the Road if Box 
Elder County does not vi in the Quiet Title Action Gi\ en the state of the econonn and the 
limited resources mailable to Box Elder Counft, the counft cannot afford to take the 
Road through eminent domain and improve it 
In their Appeal Bnef, the Selmans assert that ww[a]n overly-narrow mterpietation of 
the Ombudsman's Act unfanly denies the Selmans their statutoiy right to arbitration/' 
See Appellants Brief at page 19 (Emphasis removed) In reality, an oveily-broad 
interpretation of the Act allows the Ombudsman to assume a taking has occurred or will 
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occur, despite a dearth of evidence to support this claim, and once again, this creates an 
appearance of bias and impropriety by the Ombudsman's Office. 
2. As a matter of law, there is no taking at the present time under the 
Agricultural Protection Act, and therefore, the Ombudsman must 
assume Box Elder County has violated the Agricultural Protection Act. 
The Appellants readily admit that the property in question is in an "Agricultural 
Protection Area." See, Utah Code Ann. 17-41-401 et. seq.: Brief of Appellant at pages 4, 
5 and 8. Box Elder County agrees. Accordingly, Box Elder County must take specific 
steps to condemn the Road if it is not a road established by use as Box Elder contends: 
A political subdivision having or exercising eminent 
domain powers may not condemn for any purpose any land 
within an agriculture protection area that is being used for 
agricultural production . . . unless it has obtained approval, 
according to the procedures and requirements of this section, 
from the applicable legislative body and the advisory board. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-405. Box Elder County has not sought approval from its 
Commissioners to condemn the Road; nor has it sought approval from its advisory board 
to condemn the Road. Box Elder County's position is that the Road is established by use, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105(1) and its predecessor statutes that have been in 
existence for at least a century, see, e.g., Ch. 142 § 1116, Laws of Utah, 191. 
As a matter of law, the county cannot condemn the Road because the county has 
not gained permission to do so as required by the Utah Agriculture Protection Act. 
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specifically, Utah Code Ann.§ 17-41 -405.5 Therefore, the Ombudsman must assume the 
county has violated the Agricultural Protection Act. Again, this is improper. 
3. Where Box Elder County does not intend to condemn the Road, any 
monetary award based upon the Ombudsman's contrary assumptions 
will be useless in effecting any meaningful resolution to this case. 
Box Elder County rightly objects to the Ombudsman's lack of neutrality in this 
case: To take jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman must read the Act so 
broadh that the Act allows the Ombudsman to: (a) assume that portion of the Road that 
crosses the Selmans' property is not a public road; (b) assume that Box Elder County has 
"inversely condemned" the property; and/or ( c) assume that Box Elder County intends to 
condemn the portion of the Road that crosses the Selmans' property if the county loses 
the Quiet Title Action. 
Box Elder County objects to Ombudsman taking jurisdiction in this case because 
of bias, and also because the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that once the 
Quiet Title Action is resolved all other issues will either evaporate or become clearer. 
See Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535, 538 at |^ 10. With respect to the "inverse 
condemnation" claim, if the county loses the quiet title action, the claim evaporates, 
because the county will not take the property at issue and any damage to the property 
Here, the Selmans make the circular argument that the county is condemning the 
Road, but has violated the Utah Agricultural Protection Act. 
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from the county's commencement to improve the Road will be damages for trespass, not 
condemnation. The county will not condemn the Road; therefore, it is odd that the 
Selmans want the Ombudsman to determine damages for a taking, when there will be no 
taking - either now or in the foreseeable future. An assessment of an "award" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 is a useless and unnecessarily expensive endeavor. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm the opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals as well as the ruling of the district court. 
DATED this ^ky day of December, 2009. 
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
MfL. ft tuj/JJ 
Stephen R. Hadfield r 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this .^UVday of December, 2008, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE BOX ELDER COUNTY were sent via 
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Shaun L. Peck 
Brandon J. Baxter 
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C. 
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Attorneys for 
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BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Plaintiffs Fred, Laura, and Bret Selman are principals of 
Harold Selman, Inc. (collectively the Selmans), which engages in 
a variety of farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits 
on property the Selmans own, situated on the border between Box 
Elder and Cache Counties (the Property). Box Elder County 
attempted to build a road on a livestock trail that crossed the 
property. The Selmans sued and subsequently filed a request for 
arbitration of their dispute with the Office of the Property 
Rights Ombudsman (the Ombudsman). 
counterclaim in district court to 
The district court bifurcated the 
arbitration pending resolution of 
question before us is whether the 
permissible under the Ombudsman's 
Ombudsman Act), see Utah Code Ann. 
2008). We affirm. 
Box Elder County filed a 
quiet title in the property, 
claims and stayed the 
the quiet title action. The 
stay of arbitration is 
enabling statutes (the 
§§ 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 Situated partly in Box Elder County and partly in Cache 
County, the Property is designated by both counties as an 
Agriculture Protection Area, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-101(3) 
(Supp. 2008), and is subject to a conservation easement. A 
livestock trail, on which animals are herded to the upper grazing 
meadows, traverses the Property. 
1J3 In 2007, both counties passed resolutions claiming part of 
the Property as a county road. Later that year, Box Elder County 
initiated road construction on a remote road located on the 
Property, including the removal of a gate owned by the Selmans 
that blocked the livestock trail. The Selmans filed suit, 
praying for injunctive relief and asserting claims for trespass 
and inverse condemnation. The district court entered a Temporary 
Restraining Order halting the road construction and ordering 
reinstallation of the gate. That Temporary Restraining Order is 
still in effect. Three weeks later, the Selmans filed a second 
suit against Box Elder County asserting additional causes of 
action. The Selmans also filed suit against Cache County to 
prevent it from beginning similar road construction.1 
H4 Before Box Elder County filed its answer, the Selmans filed 
a request for arbitration of their dispute with the Ombudsman, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204, which the Ombudsman accepted. 
Box Elder County then answered the Selmans' complaint and 
asserted a counterclaim to quiet title and for injunctive relief. 
Box Elder County also filed a motion in district court to stay 
arbitration before the Ombudsman, to bifurcate the Selmans' 
claims from Box Elder County's quiet title claim, and to stay all 
1. Plaintiffs filed suit against Box Elder and Cache County 
separately. Both counties filed counterclaims. On August 7, 
2007, Judge Low granted Cache County's motion to bifurcate the 
proceedings, allowing the quiet title action to move forward to 
litigation and staying the arbitration of the remaining claims. 
Judge Low further noted that "it does not appear to be the kind 
of claim which the . . . Ombudsm[a]n was created to address in 
the first place." The Selmans filed a petition for interlocutory 
appeal with this court that was dismissed for failure to timely 
file a valid notice of appeal. On October 16, 2007, Judge 
Hadfield ordered that Box Elder County's and Cache County's cases 
be consolidated because they "involve common questions of law and 
fact." On January 14, 2008, Judge Hadfield ordered that the two 
counties' counterclaims to quiet title be tried together and 
bifurcated from the other issues. Judge Hadfield further ordered 
that discovery, deadlines, mediation, and arbitration would all 
be stayed until after the counties' quiet title counterclaims 
were resolved. 
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discovery and deadlines on the Selmans' claims until the quiet 
title claim is decided. The district court granted Box Elder 
County's motion, bifurcating the case and staying arbitration. 
The Selmans appeal that decision pursuant to the Utah Uniform 
Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 (2008) 
(allowing parties to appeal "an order granting a motion to stay 
arbitration"). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%5 We are asked to consider whether the district court erred in 
bifurcating the claims and staying arbitration of the dispute. 
This is an issue of first impression. Because we conclude that 
the outcome of this case depends on statutory interpretation, we 
review the district court's decision for correctness. See 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic 
Reference Ctr., 2008 UT 88, fl 13, 200 P.3d 643. 
ANALYSIS 
%6 "In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the 
Legislature's intent. We do so by first evaluating the best 
evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language of the 
statute itself. We give the words of a statute their plain, 
natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning." Wasatch 
County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 13, 179 P.3d 768 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). We thus carefully 
consider the statutory language at issue. 
[^7 The Ombudsman Act establishes and defines the Office of the 
Property Rights Ombudsman, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-101 to -206 
(Supp. 2008). Among other things, the Ombudsman is authorized to 
mediate or arbitrate disputes between property owners and 
government entities: 
If requested by the private property owner 
and otherwise appropriate, the . . . 
Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or 
arrange arbitration for, disputes between 
private property owners and government 
entities that involve: 
(a) takings or eminent domain issues; 
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 
78B, Chapter 6, Part 5, Eminent Domain; or 
(c) disputes about relocation assistance 
under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act. 
Id. § 13-43-204(1). 
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1f8 In this case, arbitration has been stayed pending judicial 
resolution of Box Elder County's quiet title counterclaim. 
Plaintiffs argue that quiet title actions fall under the umbrella 
of "takings or eminent domain issues" articulated by subsection 
(a), and thus should be included in, not litigated prior to, th^ 
arbitration. We disagree, concluding that this interpretation 
reads the phrase "takings or eminent domain issues" too broadly. 
^9 A "taking" is "[t]he government's actual or effective 
acquisition of private property either by ousting the owner and 
claiming title or by destroying the property or severely 
impairing its utility." Black's Law Dictionary 1467 (7th ed. 
1999). Relatedly, "eminent domain" is "[t]he inherent power of a 
governmental entity to take privately owned property, 
especially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to 
reasonable compensation for the taking." Id. at 541. Both of 
these terms begin with the premise that a private property owner 
actually owns the property at issue; title to the property is not 
in dispute. The principle of inverse condemnation, which is not 
specifically included in the Ombudsman Act but was one of the 
claims originally asserted by the Selmans, also shares that 
underlying premise: "An action brought by a property owner for 
compensation from a governmental entity that has taken the 
owner's property without bringing formal condemnation 
proceedings." Id. at 287. Even the constitutional provisions 
governing all similar claims begin with the premise that 
ownership of the property is not in dispute. See U.S. Const, 
amend. V ("[Pjrivate property [shall not] be taken for public 
use, without just compensation."); Utah Const, art. I, § 22 
("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation."). Furthermore, "[a] claimant must 
possess some protect [a]ble interest in property before that 
interest is entitled to recover under [the takings provision of 
the Utah Constitution]." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 
622, 625 (Utah 1990). This principle is applicable to inverse 
condemnations as well as direct takings. See Stevens v. LaVerkin 
City, 2008 UT App 129, ^ 21, 183 P.3d 1059. We conclude that the 
ownership of the property in dispute is a threshold issue to the 
subsequent question of whether there has been a taking. The 
facts of this case illustrate why such threshold questions are 
appropriately resolved judicially before arbitration. 
flO In their original complaint, the Selmans asserted three 
causes of action: claims for trespass and inverse condemnation 
and a petition for injunctive relief. Box Elder County did not 
assert a takings or eminent domain action and defended its 
position with a claim to quiet title. Thus, the claims in this 
case are currently amorphous. So long as the very ownership of 
the Property is in dispute, the remaining claims are undefined. 
Once the quiet title action is decided, however, the remaining 
issues are much clearer--either the Property belongs to the 
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Selmans and the action is one for inverse condemnation, trespass, 
or both, or it does not and the entire dispute most likely 
evaporates.2 
til Accordingly, we conclude that some issues peripherally 
related to a takings claim are not appropriate for arbitration by 
the Ombudsman; the ownership of the property in dispute is one 
such issue. Further, the district court clearly retains 
jurisdiction over any matters not before the Ombudsman. Indeed, 
n[t]he trial court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not 
prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(l) (2008). 
CONCLUSION 
Kl2 The quiet title action in this case does not fall under the 
statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman; that is, it is not a 
takings or eminent domain issue. Accordingly, we affirm the 
district court's ruling bifurcating the claims and staying 
arbitration pending the outcome of the quiet title claim. 
VZ+rut'tk*' /• 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
H13 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
6 Trie 
CarolynvB. McHugh, Judge' 
2. We note thai: if the action is for trespass, it does not fall 
within the scope of the Ombudsman Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-
43-201 (1) (Supp. 2008) . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Civil No: 070100436 
Judge: Ben Hadfield 
This matter came before the Court this 11 day of May 2007 upon Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs' Motion, and 
the exhibits attached to the motion, including the Affidavit of Brett Selman dated May 8, 2007 the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Brett Selman dated May 10, 2007, and the Affidavit of Fred Selman, 
dated May 11, 2007. Defendant has been provided the Complaint, Plaintiffs' Motion and copies 
of the Affidavits. Based upon the Complaint, the Motion and the exhibits attached thereto, the 
Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
Temporary Restraining Order 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs have filed a civil complaint against Box Elder County alleging, among 
other things, Violation of Agriculture Protection Area, Violation of National Environmental 
Policy Act and applicable regulations, and Violation of Conservation Easement. 
2. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, on May 9, 2007 which the 
Court has considered as a motion for temporary restraining order under URCP 65A. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating that they own property 
situated in Box Elder County upon which the Defendant has engaged and/or is engaging in road 
construction and related operations. 
4. The Plaintiffs' Motion sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating a substantial 
likelihood that the Plaintiffs may suffer irreparable harm to their private property interests unless 
the order or injunction issues. The damage that may be caused is irreparable because no 
monetary damage award would compensate Plaintiffs for the damage caused. 
5. The Plaintiffs' Motion sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating a substantial 
likelihood that the threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs whatever damage the proposed 
order or injunction may cause the Defendant. 
6. The Court finds that the order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the 
public interest. 
7. The Court finds that this case presents serious issues on the merits which should 
be the subject of further litigation. 
8. Based upon the Affidavit of Fred Selman, the Court finds that the requirement of 
security may properly be waived in this instance. 
Temporary Restraining Order i 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
9. Plaintiffs have met the requirements for the issuance of a temporary restraining 
order under URCP 65 A. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 
1. A temporary restraining order shall issue as follows: 
2. Plaintiffs shall reinstall a gate at the cattle guard located on Section 31 of the 
Selman Property. The gate may be closed, but shall not be locked. 
3. The following notice shall be posted on the gate: 
NOTICE 
The use of this road is subject to litigation currently pending in 
First District Court for Box Elder County, Case No.: 0 7010043 6 
Individuals found on private property may be 
subject to criminal prosecution, 
This sign is posted pursuant to the 
Court's Order in the above referenced case. 
4. Defendant shall not undertake any further construction, maintenance or related 
activities on the road where it traverses the Plaintiffs' property pending further hearing of the 
Court. 
5. The Court hereby waives the filing of a bond, undertaking or other security. 
6. This Order shall continue in effect until further hearing on this matter. That 
hearing is set for June 13, 2007, at 9:00 am, the earliest date available with sufficient time for the 
Court to adequately hear the parties on this matter. 
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DATED this J±_ day of May 2007 _JL" _^2 a«/pm. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY 
OF THE ORIGINAL FILED IN FIRST 
DISTRICT COL " -,3X ELDER. 
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Beamson & Peck, L.C. 
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Brad H Bearnson, P.C 
Shaun L Peck, P.C. 
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Bretton K. Hadfield, P.C. 
Brandon J. Baxter 
Daniel K. Watkins 
Wayne K.Caldwell 
Shawn P. Bailey 
Keely Schneiter * 
* Registered Patent Attorney 
June 7, 2007 
Brent Bateman, Private Property Ombudsman 
Elliot Lawrence, Private Property Ombudsman 
Utah Department of Commerce 
P.O. Box 145610 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5610 
Re: Selmans, Box Elder County, Cache County Private Property Takings Matter 
Dear Brent and Elliot: 
This letter constitutes our clients' request that the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman conduct a mediation regarding certain private property takings issues. 
As you are aware, our office represents Fred and Laura Selman, Bret and Michelle 
Selman, and Harold Selman, Inc. ("the Selmans") regarding several private real property takings 
issues involving Box Elder County and Cache County. As we have discussed, the particular 
takings issue involves resolutions passed by the Counties in April and May which make claim on 
private roads that pass through the Selmans5 real property in the mountains on the Box Elder 
County-Cache County border. 
I appreciate the time that you have taken to speak to us and the various county officials 
regarding this issue over the past few weeks. At this time the Selmans formally request that your 
office conduct a mediation regarding the takings issues pursuant UCA § 13-42-204, The parties 
to the mediation should include the Selmans, Box Elder County, and Cache County. 
It is my understanding that upon a request by a private property owner it is mandatory for 
your office conduct such a mediation. UCA § 13-42-204(1). It is my further understanding that 
it is mandatory for the counties to participate in such mediation arranged for by your office as if it 
74 West 100 North 
P.O. Box 675 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 787-9700 
Telefax: (435) 787-2455 
bbaxter@bplaw.biz 
Brent Bateman, Private Property Ombudsman 
Elliot Lawrence, Private Property Ombudsman 
June 7, 2007 
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were ordered by the Court. UCA § 13-42-204(2). If you believe my interpretation of the 
mandatory nature of this mediation is in error, please contact me immediately. Furthermore, if 
your office intends to decline this request for mediation on statutory or other grounds, also 
contact me immediately. 
As further background regarding the nature of the dispute, I have attached here for your 
reference, pleadings filed by the Selmans in First District Court against Box Elder County and 
Cache County. I have also attached a copy of an administrative appeal that has been filed in 
Cache County. 
I would ask that you contact Cache County and Box Elder County at your earliest 
convenience to inform them of our mediation request. After you have made contact with these 
government entities, I look forward to setting a day for our mediation. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have questions or would like to discuss this 
matter further. 
Yours truly, 
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C. 
Brandon J, Baxter 
BJB/ah 
Enclosures 
cc: Fred & Laura Selman (w/out enclosures) 
Bret & Michelle Selman (w/out enclosures) 
ADDENDUM "D 
Iii the First Judicial District Court 
In and for Cache County, State of Utah 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, arid BRET SELMAN, 
Plaiutiff(s), 
vs. 
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant(s). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Number: 070101434 MI 
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate 
and Stay filed on July 17, 2007. The County requests to bifurcate the proceedings, litigate the issue with 
respect to the County's claim to quiet title, and stay any flirther proceedings relative to further claims made 
by the Plaintiffs. After review of the memoranda and affidavits filed in this case, the Court is satisfied that 
judicial economy would be achieved should a bifurcation occur, and that the County's counterclaim should 
be first litigated as it may be dispositive of a number of other claims made by the Plaintiffs which would 
be better addressed separately. Additionally, it does not appear to be the kind of claim which the State 
Office of Properly Rights Ombudsmen was created to address in the first place. The Court does have 
jurisdiction to control this litigation despite the reference to the State Office of Pioperty Rights and 
therefore, this Memorandum Decision will serve as notice that the proposed Order Bifurcating and Staying 
Claims filed with the motion has been adopted by this Court and signed and entered this 7th day of August, 
2007. 
ADDUNDUM UE" 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD SELMAR INC. a Utah 
Corporation: FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim i 
Defendants, 
vs. 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant, 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
vs. 
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 1 
MEMORAND1IM DECISION 
Case No. 070100436 
Judge: Ben H. Iladfield 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant and counterclaimant 
Box Elder County's (hereinafter the "County") Motion to Bifurcate and Stay, In preparation of its 
decision, the Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in Support. Plaintiffs' 
Response in Opposition, Defendant's Reply in Further Support, Plaintiffs" Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support, each 
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document submitted before the Court, and the applicable ease law and statutory provisions. ALo, 
a hearing was held in this matter on December 13, 2007. Furthermore, on August 7. 2007, Judge 
Gordon J. Low rendered a Memorandum Decision in a substantially similar proceeding in Cache 
County (Case No. 070101434) granting Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay. The 
Cache County and Box Elder County matters have now been consolidated into the present case. 
Under Rule 42(b), a court may uin furtherance of convenience oi to avoid prejudicef,] 
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third party claim, or any separate 
issue or of any number of claims,... counterclaims ... or issues." The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "trial courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding bifurcation and consolidation 
requests under rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." See, e g.t Coleman v. DiUman% 624 
P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1981) (bifurcation under rule 42 may be accomplished for the com enience 
and at the discretion of the trial court); Raggenbtick v Suhrmann, 325 P.2cl 258, 259 (Utah 1958) 
(absent prejudice to a litigant, the trial court has discretion to consolidate matters for trial). 
In seeking bifurcation and a stay, the County argues that their counterclaim to quiet title 
should be tried prior to litigation and/or arbitration on Plaintiffs' claims. The County argues that 
there is a threshold question as to ownership of the disputed road which should be resolved first 
in order to further convenience, avoid prejudice and the expense of litigating unnecessary claims, 
and efficiently resolve the instant matter. Plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants (hereinafter the 
"Selmans") challenge the County's road resolution on various grounds and contend it constitutes 
a taking, thus (arguably) requiring the County's participation in arbitration arranged by the Office 
of the Property Rights Ombudsman, in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-204(2). 
However, the County argues that bifurcation should nonetheless be granted because if the road 
belongs to the County, then the Sclmans' claims fail; conversely, the County concedes that if the 
Selmans' arc determined to be the rightful owners, then a taking cannot occur without payment 
of just compensation. Finally, the County argues that the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman's requirement that the County submit to arbitration should be stayed by thus Couit 
until a determination has been made on the threshold issue of ownership. According!}, the 
County seeks the Court to find that the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low is the "law 
of the case"5 and that it should control the Court's decision as to Box Eldei County. 
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In response, Plaintiffs argue that bifurcation and staying the arbitration is contrary to 
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43, and fails to make the matter more convenient or efficient 
Plaintiffs argue that given the statutory mandate, regarding arbitration, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
43-204(2), the court should deny the requested stay, Plaintiffs claim that the Court should give 
deference to the Legislature and the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in allowing the 
matter to be first heard in arbitration. In response, the County argues that the statute does not 
prohibit judicial authority to stay such proceedings, noting that the arbitration provided for under 
the Act is subject to de novo review, UTAH CODE ANN, § 13-43-204(3)(l). See aha UTAH CODF 
ANN. § 78-3-4 ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all maters civil and criminal, and 
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law."). Accordingly, the County 
seeks a stay of arbitration until after determination of ownership. 
Plaintiffs also assert that bifurcation would be unfair and prejudicial to the Selmans and 
that the issues are not clearly separable, as argued by Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue 
that arbitration, not bifurcation of complicated matters, is the most cost-efficient manner by 
which the parties could resolve the matter. Plaintiffs also cite to the holding of Walker Drug Co , 
Inc. v La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) and assert, similarly, that bifurcation in the 
instant matter would be unfair. However, the County properly distinguishes Walker Drug 
wherein the issue of damages was tried prior to a determination of liability (known as ''reverse 
bifurcation^). In the instant matter, the Court finds that an action to quiet title would be an 
appropriate issue for bifurcation (clearly not ''reverse bifurcation") and within the Court's 
discretion to so order. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
i%
any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties [emphasis added]/' Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that the Memorandum Decision 
rendeied by Judge Low, as it adjudicates fewer than all the claims of the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parlies, can be revised by the Court under Rule 54fb) and notwithstanding the 
"'law of the case" doctrine cited by Defendant. 
J 
After reviewing the pleadings and the parties' arguments presented at the December 13, 
2007 hearing, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs" analysis that pursuant to Rule 54(b). the Court has 
the authority to revise the Memorandum Decision rendered by Judge Low on August 7, 2007; 
however, the Court finds no reason to revise the Decision. The rationale set forth in Judge Low's 
August 7, 2007 Decision corresponds with this Court's view of the bifurcation issue. Accordingly, 
the Court finds that the Memorandum Decision entered by Judge Low on August 7, 2007, will not 
be revised and will govern this consolidated matter. Case No. 070100436, and apply to Box Elder 
County, 
The Court also finds that the threshold issue as to ownership of the disputed road should 
be resolved first, as bifurcation is likely to further convenience and an efficient resolution to this 
matter. Furthermore, the Court finds that bifurcation should be granted because regardless of who 
actually owns the property, an initial determination of ownership would likely lead the parties to 
negotiate a settlement of remaining claims. Finally, with respect to the Property Rights 
Ombudsman Act, it appears that the Court has the authority to issue a stay. Theiefore, the Court 
will order a stay, but reserves for future adjudication the question of whether the Property Rights 
Ombudsman Act applies to the instant matter. This issue may be raised after the threshold issue of 
ownership is determined. 
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low on August 7, 2007, 
and as supported by the facts and governing law, Defendant and counterclaimant Box lilder 
County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay is granted. Also, implicit in this Memorandum Decision, 
the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider August 7, 2007 Order to Bifurcate and Stay. 
Counsel for Defendant is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith 
Dated this 3 P da> of December, 2007 
BY THE COURT: 
KZ- A. / f j y 
BcnH Hadficid /' 
DISTRICT COUR F JIJDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^< day of December, 2007, I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision in the case of Selman 
vs. B.E. County and Cache County case number 070100436, as follows' 
Barton II. Kunz II 
Attorney At Law 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
N. George Daines 
Cache County Attorney 
199 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Stephen R. Iladfield 
Box Elder County Attorney 
09 West Forest Street, Suite 310 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Shaun L. Peck 
Brandon J. Baxter 
Attorneys At Law 
74 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
ADDENDUM UF" 


LJtLiJ 
. ! 
1 4143A 
~£fiS&3_. 
4 
- f' " ^ * » 
ft. y ^ s . ^ ^ O 
1 
l l r f 
jar 
ir Jir 
^if^^M*^ 
Z 
T 
Z 
• 2 2 ? 
7 
i 1 1 1 I'TT'l 1 I l | !—j 1 I'l 1 1 1 I | 1 1 ' I'l 1 I 1 | I ! 1 
i ' M M i l l M i l 
1 ; I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 I 1 
" i i l l i l l i i ! ! i 1 ll 
J M, . 111 ' \ \ i ,J i ! • 
M 1 i r i r T r t T I if 1 f I T ( I ' ! \l 1 
i ilium, i' 11. 
TnTTTm ii nrmff l n 11 ra 
i 1 
1 11111 i II j 1111 j | k i i f i in i n TB II 1 S 
I ' M P I P ' * til I I MP IH 
fj 1 l in- rl ml |@ 
l imll l l l l l l l l l l lMl l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l 

